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The announcement made last week by President Barack Obama on resizing the US missile shield in Europe, planned by the previous Bush Administration to be installed in Eastern Europe (Poland and the Czech Republic) immediately raised questions about the foreign policy stance taken by the US. His option, decided according to authorized opinion and advice from the Pentagon, immediately came under fire from all parts. At home, the Republican opposition accused that the choice proves weakness against Russia and yields to pressure from Kremlin, while at international scale voices were heard from various directions accusing that America’s allies from Eastern Europe have been cheated and now they face a new Yalta, meaning a new division of the spheres of influence, the same as it happened during World War 2, when this part of Europe came under Moscow’s control.
It is well known that installing the American missile shield sparks much controversy at international level. Since the very moment when the idea arose to set up this nuclear shield, a few years ago, Russia protested energetically and now, when there are certain signs that it will be installed (the accord signed with Poland in August 2008) it threatened to take countermeasures, such as installing its own medium-range missiles (Iskander) in the Kaliningrad enclave. Thus, Moscow tried to provoke a split in the European community, showing that the defence by the US of Eastern Europe – a former area of Russian influence – will turn the West of the continent into the potential target of a possible Russian nuclear retaliation. As a result, the Western allies of the US – Germany and France first – called for complete transparency in installing the shield and urged that negotiations begin with Russia. It is also true that the East European states which joined NATO in the last decade, in absence of NATO contingency plans for the eventuality of aggressions against their territories, appreciated the US military presence on their soil as an additional insurance for the applicability of article V of the Washington Treaty, whose validity was – and still is – put at doubt (the article provides for the allies’ support for the state that falls victim to an aggression, but without specifically mentioning this obligation, which is left to the decision of each ally). On the other hand, East European states showed the highest interest for the US military presence in their countries, which is considered as a deterrent for possible aggressions, hence a real commitment of the USA to independence and the democratic process launched in the post-communist era. To such an extent did the perception become common place that – for instance – Poland’s accord for installing the shield’s interceptors was signed with massive public support – a support that had been missing so far in the conditions of the Russian attack in Georgia, during the summer of 2008. As a consequence, any sign that the US will drop these plans is perceived as a radical change of the US policy toward Eastern Europe and Russia. Following this logic thread, it is of significance the undeserved attention granted to the day when Obama made the announcement on resizing the plans for the missile shield. September 17 is considered bad omen, as this was the day when, in 1939, Soviet troops entered Western Poland, which they occupied, following an agreement that divided the spheres of influence in Eastern Europe between Stalin and Hitler.
In the present day’s circumstances, the case of the US missile shield in Eastern Europe can be evaluated depending on the answer to two questions.
First: Did the US renounce installing the missile shield in the East of the continent? The answer is, obviously, negative. The implementation of the Bush version of these plans has been delayed, as installing the interceptors in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic is “pushed” toward 2015, when Iran might have capabilities to hit with long range missiles and when technological breakthrough will make countering them effective. The new version of these plans, announced by Obama last week, provides for countering possible strikes from Iran, with medium and short range missiles, by locating land or sea systems (such as the Aegis missiles of the US fleet) in the space close to Iran, in the area defined by the East of the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. This modified version of the missile shield is both reliable from a technological point of view and favourable in economic terms.
Second: Did the US renounce their commitment toward their allies in Eastern Europe? Once again, the answer is obviously negative. The US maintains the commitments to its allies, as it believes protecting them and their interests through the nuclear shield is in line with the national interests of the US, as it has been until now. “This new approach will provide capability sooner, build on proven systems and offer greater defences against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defence program,” Obama said. He added that the system he is embracing will offer “stronger, smarter and swifter defences of American forces and America’s Allies.”
It is nonetheless true, there is the danger that Moscow might see the resizing of the plans for the US missile shield as a sign that the US are yielding to its imperative requests. Russia already announced it will renounce installing the Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. However, there are small chances that the experienced Russian diplomacy will appreciate Obama’s announcement last week as consent to a Yalta-type policy and a possible recognition of Russian spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Now, Washington is waiting from Russia strong signs of cooperation with the Western world on solving the Iranian nuclear case.
Thus, Obama’s announcement on the nuclear shield in Europe shatters away a persistent myth – that the US reset their relations with Russia at the price of sacrificing the states of Eastern Europe – and imposes the reality that Washington confirms its regional commitment to its allies.
